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1. INTRODUCTION
An increasingly prevalent form of international business
organization is the strategic alliance,' a species of joint
venture in which two or more firms of differing nationalities
contract for the joint exploitation of technology2 and other
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'Jorde and Teece define a strategic alliance as:
a bilateral or multilateral relationship characterized by the
commitment of two or more partner firms to a common goal. A
strategic alliance typically includes a constellation of agreements
involving (1) technology swaps, (2) joint R&D or co-development,
and/or (3) the sharing of complementary assets, such as where one
party does manufacturing and the other distribution for a co-
developed product.
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust,
in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 55 (Thomas M. Jorde
& David J. Teece eds., 1992).
' In certain strategic alliances each participating firm contributes core
technology. In others, the firms may shift roles. The alliance between
Honeywell (USA) and NEC (Japan) originally depended on Honeywell's core
computer technology. Ultimately, relative technological strength shifted so
that Honeywell sought a technology transfer from NEC. Louise Kehoe &
Yoko Shibata, NEC-Honeywell Pact to Fight IBM, FIN. TimEs, Oct. 21, 1983,
at 33;NEC Licenses Computer Technology to Honeywell, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct.
25, 1983, at 10.
In some sense, both firms will always contribute technology to the
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assets in particular national territories.' These alliances can
be distinguished from entity joint ventures, as they do not
involve the formation and joint ownership of a legally separate
firm which exploits the shared technology. Rather, the
participating firms coordinate joint activity within limits
structured by a series of agreements.6
Frequently one participating firm in an international
strategic alliance ("ISA7) will provide a distinctive technological
innovation; the second firm will contribute complementary
alliance. As Hennart points out, effective distribution relies on firm-specific
knowledge of the local market, which can certainly be thought of as a kind
of "technology." Jean-Francois Hennart, A Transaction Costs Theory of
Equity Joint Ventures, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 361, 367 (1988) [hereinafter
Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint Ventures].
' In late 1983, AT&T (USA) and Olivetti (Italy) entered an alliance in
which AT&T purchased a 25 percent equity stake in Olivetti for $260 million.
The agreement enabled AT&T to benefit from Olivetti's distribution channels
throughout Europe for AT&Ts personal computers. AT&T, in turn, agreed
to market some of Olivetti's office products in the United States. Merrill
Brown, AT&T to Buy 25% of Olivetti, WASH. PoST, Dec. 22, 1983, at D1;
James Buxton, Olivetti Teams with a Colossus, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1983,
sec. I, at 10. Additionally, the alliance called for joint development of
products, cross-licensing of selected hardware lines for domestic
manufacturing, and access for Olivetti to AT&T's Bell Laboratories' research
and development product. Id. The alliance also anticipated the development
of interface hardware and software, which would allow communications and
networking of various AT&T and Olivetti product lines. AT&T to Acquire
25% of Olivetti for $260M; Product Reciprocity Seen, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Dec.
26, 1983, at 1.
' In an entity joint venture, the two joint venture partners establish an
independent corporation. The joint venture partners are the stockholders
of the joint venture entity, which then operates the business. To the extent
that a participant firm interacts with the joint venture entity, it does so on
a formal third-party basis. Entity joint ventures are traditionally
distinguished from "contractrjoint ventures; ISAs are contract joint ventures.
'In March 1990, United Technologies' Pratt & Whitney subsidiary and
Daimler-Benz' Motoren- und Turbinen-Union (MTU) announced that they
were integrating their commercial and general aviation engine R&D,
manufacturing and marketing. Jet Maker, Daimler Expand Ies-Deal May
Help Germans Develop Commercial Aircraft Industry, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Mar. 28, 1990, at C3. Although this is a contract-based alliance,
the firms established a joint governing body called the Executive Advisory
Board to manage those programs jointly pursued by MTU and Pratt &
Whitney. See Stanley W. Kandebo, United Technologies, Daimler-Benz Sign
Agreement Linking Pratt & Whitney, MTU, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 18, 1991, at 29.
' These are called "structural agreements" in this Article.
7 See Thomas F. Villeneuve & Daniel M. Kaufman, Creating Successful
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assets, such as capital,' distribution channels,' product line
niches, services, or enhancement of reputation to the
innovator."0  An ISA may also involve research and
development obligations, manufacturing and supply
relationships, and rights to future technology.1" Although the
firms participating in the ISA maintain independent centers
of control, 2 there may also be equity links.' Thus, ISAs are
inherently complex.
A single innovator will frequently establish multiple
strategic alliances.' 4 Larger established firms will also enter
multiple alliances in order to access a range of new
technologies." Thus a specific firm may serve as a nexus for
a complex web of alliances. This possibility has an intriguing,
Technology-Based Corporate Partnering Arrangements, 9 COMPUTER LAW.
10 (1992) [hereinafter Villeneuve & Kaufman].
" In alliances involving small, innovating companies, a larger industrial
company typically provides equity or debt capital, or directly funds research
and development. Villeneuve & Kaufman, supra note 7, at 10.
' When the Honeywell/NEC alliance was originally formed, NEC operated
as Honeywell's sales agent. NEC boosted Honeywell's profits and increased
Honeywell's share of the Asian computer market. With Allies Like These...,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 75.
" Villeneuve and Kaufman list the following objectives for firms entering
strategic alliances: funding, validation, risk sharing, access to technology
and expertise, access to distribution channels and customer bases, access to
manufacturing capacity and second-source arrangements, creation of
manufacturing capacity, preventing competition, and prelude to acquisition.
Villeneuve & Kaufman, supra note 7, at 11-13.
* See Id. at 11.
, See Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition:
A Perspective on the Types and Purposes of Technology Joint Ventures, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 861, 868 (1993) (citing Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic of
Strategic Alliances, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 143-54).
13 See Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at 55.
14 Sequoia Systems Inc., a manufacturer of fault-tolerant computers, has
entered into alliances with Hewlett-Packard and Samsung. Mark
McLaughlin, Sequoia Systems: Hitting All the Right Numbers, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 16, 1991, at 80. A small Boston-area ielecommunications firm
has reportedly established alliances with over 40 other companies. Josh
Hyatt, It's All Who You Know; Faced With Brutal Competition, Smaller Tech
Firms Turn to Alliances with Bigger Partners, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1992,
at 37; see also Villeneuve & Kaufman, supra note 7, at 10.
15 Compton reports that IBM has invested over $500 million in more than
three dozen alliances. See Compton, supra note 12, at 864 (citing Evelyn
Richards, IBMAlliances: Bid to Regain Control; Computer Giant Counters
Slippage by Assembling Family of Innovative Firms, WASH. POST, July 7,
1991, at H1).
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and perhaps troublesome, effect on firms possessing proprietary
technology; competitor firms may be linked through a common
alliance partner, permitting unauthorized diffusion of
technological advantages.'"
Strategic alliances, unlike traditional joint ventures, do not
rely on the constitution of a separate legal entity to resolve
latent questions of governance.' The ISA participants must
engineer non-entity structures" which can resolve operational
and strategic control disputes" and which place limitations
" Network analysis is appropriate for analyzing these questions. The
existence of ISAs may accelerate general technological diffusion.
There are also potential antitrust aspects that merit exploration. Stable
cartels may result from the intersection of strategic alliances. See infra
notes 81-84 and accompanying text; see also Jorde & Teece, supra note 1, at
59.
17 Incorporation under a specific national legal system has often been
thought to be the purchase of a "prepackaged," 1contractual specification for
the resolution of a host of governance and authority issues. See John C.
Coffee Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUm. L. REV. 1618, 1618-19 (1989). This approach
views the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." See Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (1982);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311
(1976); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability 'Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1984).
" Villeneuve and Kaufman observe:
Most [strategic alliances] are done in the form of a purely
contractual relationship. Occasionally, it may be advantageous to
create a formal partnership or separate corporate entity for tax,
accounting, cultural or liability limitation reasons, but creation of
a separate entity usually is dictated more by the desire to ensure
management and operational independence. In fact, except where
the parties intend to create a new truly independent business,
separate entities are generally more trouble than they are worth.
Villeneuve & Kaufman, supra note 7, at 11.
1" The "relational contract" school established by Macneil distinguishes
between classical contracting, used for discrete market exchanges, and
relational contracting, which applies to longer-term arrangements through
which parties deal repeatedly. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter, Macneil,
Adjustment of Economic Relations]; Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). Contracts entered within the
context of a continuing relationship are less subject to opportunistic
breaches, as the contracting parties are unlikely to risk the destruction of
the future benefits realizable by maintaining the relation. See Macneil,
Adjustment of Economic Relations, supra at 887. International strategic
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on any alliance participant's unilateral discretion as part of the
overall organizational design.0 ° Control and its corresponding
limits may be explicitly addressed by the parties, by either
contractual specification 1 or by resort to extracontractual
mechanisms."* The resolution of control issues may also be
imputed by operation of national law.2"
ISAs, as complex structures, demonstrate a great variety
of features, with multiple relations between the alliance
partners.2" This complexity largely frustrates meaningful
classification. 5 Rather than seek to describe the entire range
of ISA variants, this Article will focus its attention on two
alliances are clearly situated toward the "relational" pole on Macneil's
relational/classical axis. See generally Salbu, infra note 20.
' See Steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND.
L. REV. 397, 419-20 (1991).
2 1See infra text in Section 3.1.
22 There is a diverse body of contracts scholarship which examines
structural or extracontractual methods for assuring performance. Macaulay,
anticipating Macneil, analyzes non-contractual devices used within "exchange
relationships." See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REV. 55, 56 (1963).
In their model, Klein and Leffler explicitly assume that transactors "rely
solely on the threat of termination of the business relationship for
enforcement of contractual promises." Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffier,
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 615, 616 (1981) (footnote omitted). Reputations and brand names
function as "private devices which provide incentives that assure contract
performance in the absence of any third-party enforcer." Id. at 616 (citations
omitted).
Charny also sees commercial reputation as an important consideration
assuring reliability. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 376 (1990). Narasimhan studies the
role played by renewal clauses in successive contracts. Subha Narasimhan,
Relationship or Boundary? Handling Successive Contracts, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1077 (1989).
" The school of relational contracts suggests that courts should provide
missing terms and otherwise impute obligations to the parties to the
relationship with an eye both to fairness and to the maintenance of the
relationship. See Macneil, Adjustment of Economic Relations, supra note 19,
at 875-76, 886-88.4 See, eg., Compton, supra note 12, app. A, at 879-94.
-5 Attempts to type the immense variety of complex strategic
arrangements are subject to unavoidable arbitrariness. Compton, for
example, sets up six "basic variants:" (1) cross-licensing agreements, (2) joint
marketing, distribution, and sales agreements, (3) joint product development
agreements, (4) traditional joint ventures, (5) consortia and (6) strategic
alliances. Compton, supra note 12, at 864-68.
1993]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
archetypal relations frequently found in ISAs: the Joint
Production Relation and the Distribution Relation. These
relations are common basic elements of ISAs; 6 any particular
ISA, however, will involve several relations. Recognize that
these elements are Platonically sketched at their functional
limits; there may likely not be any actual ISA whose component
relations precisely match these features.
The Joint Production Relation involves the transfer of
proprietary technology in order to coordinate the sharing of
production responsibility between the two participating firms
within an ISA."7 Assume one firm ("Firm USA") produces
supercomputers with proprietary technology. Firm USA may
enter into an alliance with a second firm ("Firm Japan"), under
which Firm USA transfers its technology to Firm Japan,
enabling Firm Japan to produce supercomputers in Japan.
The Joint Production Relation will have a characteristic
legal form, with both contract and property aspects. The
contract aspect of the Joint Production Relation involves Firm
USA's affirmative obligation to transfer the technology and
Firm Japan's obligation of non-disclosure. The property aspect
involves Firm Japan's legitimate use of the technology owned
by Firm USA (legally embodied in the assignment of national
intellectual property interests); it may also invest rights in
Firm Japan to act against third-party infringers.
The Distribution Relation involves one firm operating as an
exclusive distributor of the output of the other firm for a
particular national market. Firm USA, the supercomputer
manufacturer, may enter into an alliance with Firm Japan,
perhaps itself a producer of computers, by which Firm USA
grants Firm Japan the exclusive right to distribute certain of
Firm USA's products in the Japanese national territory."
2 A third elemental form found within many ISAs is the Joint Product
Development Relation, whereby the two participants jointly develop a new
technology that will be jointly owned. This joint-ownership feature positions
these alliances closer to equity joint ventures.
" The technology transfer aspect distinguishes the Joint Production
Relation from common supplier relationships.
"' Were this the entire relationship between Firm USA and Firm Japan,
we would describe it as a simple exclusive distributorship; an ISA anticipates
greater organizational complexity. Perhaps Firm USA would reciprocally
distribute Firm Japan's products within the United States or the two firms
might jointly develop new lines of products for other markets. The point is
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The Distribution Relation within an ISA is also likely to
have a specific legal form, with both a contract aspect and a
property aspect. The principal contract features are both
negative (disabling) and positive. Firm USA grants Firm
Japan the exclusive right to distribute the supercomputers
within the Japanese territory. Thus, Firm USA is contractually
disabled from appointing another firm to distribute within the
Japanese territory, and in many cases, is itself disabled from
servicing that territory. Firm USA is also bound to supply
Firm Japan with products. Firm Japan, in turn, is bound to
diligently promote sales of Firm USA's products within the
Japanese territory.
Second, there is the property aspect of the Distribution
Relation. Firm USA will grant Firm Japan trademark rights
for Firm USA's products, enabling Firm Japan to utilize
existing consumer goodwill in order to effectively market the
products. Technical information will also be provided to Firm
Japan to enable it to fulfill the support and service functions
associated with the sale of Firm USA's products.
This Article will emphasize the role of extracontractual
assurances for continued performance and cooperation of the
participants during the life-cycle of the ISA.2" Judicial
contract enforcement does have some value in binding the
participants to the ISA. 0 I stress the extracontractual
features because the respective obligations will likely fall
within the interstices of two legal systems"1 and because of
that an exclusive national distributorship is a typical elemental feature of
an ISA.
" ISAs display a characteristic life-cycle. There is a clearly demarcated
period of formation and start-up, followed by operation, and termination.
The termination may be planned or catastrophic, and may be cooperative or
non-cooperative. Catastrophic, non-cooperative terminations are described
as "alliance failure" in this Article; the prospect of alliance failure, I argue,
is critical for understanding the organization of an ISA. See infra text in
Section 4.
" General Electric (USA) won a temporary restraining order against
MTU, its alliance partner, to block MTU from entering into a competing
alliance with Pratt & Whitney. See infra note 120.
*' Because ISAs involve the coordination of complex economic activity
across national boundaries, there are multiple, and often competing, legal
regimes in play. No one regime fully controls the ISA relationship. See infra
text in Section 2.2.
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the presence of other enforcement uncertainties. 2 This
establishes a significant arena for possible opportunistic hold-
up by one party or the other, a problem magnified in a
transnational setting by the inevitable legal ambiguities and
unavoidable presence of specification gaps associated with
complexity.
Given the inadequacy of reliable enforcement of stipulated
contractual obligations under national legal systems, as well
as a conceivable reluctance by ISA participants to engage the
judicial process, I will argue that ISAs rely heavily on
extracontractual mechanisms as a means of ensuring reliability
of performance and overall cooperation. Specifically, I will
examine the extracontractual aspects of (1) the licensing of
technology from one firm to the other that underlies the Joint
Production Relation, and (2) the corresponding allocation
between the two firms of distribution rights to particular
national markets that underlies the Distribution Relation.
Both the licensing of technology 4 and the allocation of
national distribution rights 5 operate to bond the two firms
participating in the alliance, thus ensuring continued
performance and cooperation as well as depressing the
probability of an opportunistic breach. Although both license
agreements and distributorship agreements are typically
normal contracts in that they are sets of consensual
undertakings, 6 they both have significant extracontractual
' These uncertainties include hostility to enforcement of foreign
judgments, fairness concerns with respect to foreign persons, conflicts of law
issues and the possibility of judicial indifference due to the attenuation of
any particular nationality of an ISA. See infra text in Section 2.2.
" Even were contract enforcement assuredly available, parties to an ISA
might value the alternative provided by extracontractual assurances to avoid
litigation. Extracontractual mechanisms may be thought of as a form of
alternative dispute resolution.
" The exchange of technology between the firms participating in the
alliance operates to assure performance and cooperation. Thus, the license
serves as a "technology bond." See infra text in Section 5.1.
See infra text in Section 5.2.
u I associate the normal contract aspects of these agreements as yielding
the traditional contract remedies of restitution, damages or mandated
(specific) performance under a particular national legal regime. See infra
text in Section 2.2.
My use of the terms "contract" and "contractual" differs, for example,
from the more encompassing definition of Macaulay, who defines contract
(for purposes of distinguishing non-contractual devices) as involving two
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features."'
The model of an ISA examined in this Article is
characterized by the following features: (1) a licensor firm, in
the example Firm USA, which has developed and which
continues to "own" (at least in the legal sense) the core
technology; (2) a licensee firm, in the example Firm Japan,
which provides a mix of capital, inputs and services (typically
including distribution services) to be used to develop and
exploit the core technology in specific national markets;"8 and
(3) a complex,"9 non-entity structure, by which the two firms
coordinate their respective contributions and through which
they distribute the economic fruits of their collaboration. This
structure includes (a) the licensing of the technology,'0
formalizing the Joint Production Relation, and/or (b) the
explicit allocation of particular national markets' and the
licensing of national trademarks, formalizing the Distribution
Relation.
elements: "(a) [rational planning of the transaction with careful provision
for as many future contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence
or use of actual or potential legal sanctions to induce performance of the
exchange or to compensate for non-performance." Macaulay, supra note 22,
at 56. I consider arrangements which provide for legal sanctions other than
traditional contract remedies to be extracontractual devices. See infra note
94.
37The extra-contractual features are associated with different remedies
or with self-help. For example, an injunction forbidding continued
exploitation of a licensed technology is based more on the ownership of the
underlying property right than on pure contract notions, even when the
remedy addresses a scenario of contractual breach. A grantor of an exclusive
distributorship which reasserts control of a territory by appointing a new
distributor is exercising self-help. See infra Section 3.1.
s See supra note 1.
"' Complexity refers both to the number of underlying economic relations
between the ISA participants and to the multiplicity of structural agreements
constituting the ISA. See infra text in Section 3.1.
" Motorola (USA) licensed microchip technology to Toshiba (Japan) as
part of its alliance. See infra note 111.
4 AT&T and Olivetti allocated national markets for certain products.
AT&T distributed Olivetti office machines in the United States and Olivetti
distributed AT&T computers in certain Western European nations. See
supra note 3.
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2. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING
2.1. Organizational Theory Aspects
There are several competing theories which account for the
existence of complex economic institutions, such as firms.
Chief of these, at least in current intellectual vogue, is
transaction cost theory,"' an analytic framework synthesized
and advanced by Oliver Williamson.' 8 While Williamson only
gives passing attention to hybrid organizations," such as
ISAs, others (notably Jean-Francois Hennart, in the case of
equity joint ventures45 ) have applied transaction cost theory
to explain the existence of hybrids.
Coase first posed the institutional question in terms of
transactions:' why certain transactions are executed across
markets and why others are internalized within the unitary
firm. The focus of Coase's inquiry is the phenomena of
"transaction costs,"' deadweight losses associated with the
coordination of factors. The principle of minimizing
transactions costs is the intellectual link between a theory of
the firm and a theory of the market."8 The institutional
question, as viewed by Coase, is markedly bipolar: transactions
are coordinated either through market exchange or within
unitary firms.
Organizational hybrids, such as ISAs, where two firms
retain their identities but subject certain transactions between
41 Transaction cost theory is offered as an alternative to other theories
of the firm. These other theories include explanations rooted in class
struggle (a view that firms exist to extend hierarchy for its own sake),
technology (a view that firms permit realization of economies of scale) and
monopoly power (that firms are suited to suppress competition through
horizontal and vertical integration). See Oliver Williamson, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1 (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS).
See generally Williamson, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 42.
ISAs and joint ventures are classified as "hybrids" because they have
certain attributes of firms, yet the contrasting interests of their principals
remain unsuppressed. Likewise, their governance and control can be thought
of as a "hybrid" of command (through an internal hierarchy) and bargaining.
See Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 2.
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.s.) 386 (1937).
"As Coase himself points out in a later essay, he does not use the term
"transaction costs" in The Nature of the Firm. Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET
AND THE LAW (1988). The notion, however, is unmistakable.
4Williamson, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 6-7.
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them to a quasi-hierarchical governance structure, are not
anticipated by Coase in his 1937 work. If the existence of ISAs
is explained by transaction cost differentials, ISAs must be
superior to both (i) market exchange and (ii) unitary firm
alternatives in certain circumstances. What these
circumstances are, of course, awaits further theoretical
elaboration.
The transaction cost approach was expanded and its
explanatory power significantly enhanced by the work of Oliver
Williamson.4' Williamson views the firm as one of a set of
possible institutional relationships structured in order to
reduce the hazards of idiosyncratic bargaining that inevitably
arise in various "small-numbers" circumstances, such as asset
specificity and long-term commercial dealings. According to
Williamson, firms and complex contracts exist as responses to
"opportunism," a tendency of human behavior arising in small-
numbers conditions, in the presence of bounded rationality."
By bounded rationality, Williamson is specifying a behavioral
assumption: that human actors (and their institutions) seek
to rationally maximize, but do so subject to certain cognitive
limits. These limits are exceeded, for example, by the presence
of situational complexity and uncertainty.
5'
Were rationality unbounded, there would be no contractual
difficulties, as the parties would be able to foresee all possible
contingencies and could stipulate appropriate adjustments."2
It is the presence of bounded rationality that creates the
potential for market failure. Parties are not able ex ante to
adequately foresee conditions that may arise after the contract
is stipulated. Further, the parties cannot adequately anticipate
strategic moves which may be made ex post by their
counterpart. The limits of bounded rationality may suggest the
"' Williamson notes that the notion oftransaction cost differentials as the
chief determinant of institutional form, as initially formulated, was rather
vacuous, and perhaps tautological. Id. at 4. Williamson's inquiries focus on
why transaction cost differentials (between alternative institutional
arrangements) arise.
SO "Bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on which transaction
cost economics relies." Id. at 45.
" OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 23-24 (1975) [hereinafter MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES].
'2 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 30-31.
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use of firms."
Cognitive limits are quite likely to be exceeded by the
demands of coordination necessary to exploit complex
technologies across national and cultural lines. A transaction
cost explanation for the existence of ISAs may well rest on how
this particular institutional governance structure addresses the
problem of bounded rationality.
The second major behavioral assumption contained in
Williamson's synthesis is that of "opportunism," which
Williamson defines as "self-interest seeking with guile."54
Opportunism is the tendency of human actors to depart from
rules, a "troublesome source of 'behavioral' uncertainty in
economic transactions"55 that must be addressed in designing
institutional relationships.
Some transactions are more vulnerable than others to ex
post opportunism; it is these transactions that can most benefit
from ex ante safeguards against opportunism, such as the
making of credible commitments or the institution of superior
governance structures, such as firms. While Williamson feels
that opportunism is (at least operationally) a general
characteristic, he admits that the tendency toward opportunism
is variably distributed over human actors.5" This variability
" According to Williamson:
If... it is very costly or impossible to identify future contingencies
and specify, ex ante, appropriate adaptations thereto, long-term
contracts may be supplanted by internal organization. Recourse to
the latter permits adaptations to uncertainty to be accomplished by
administrative processes in a sequential fashion. Thus, rather than
attempt to anticipate all possible contingencies from the outset, the
future is permitted to unfold. Internal organization in this way
economizes on the bounded rationality attributes of decision makers
in circumstances in which prices are not "sufficient statistics" and
uncertainty is substantial.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 51, at 9.
" WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 47.
5 d. at 49.
5 Williamson states:
It is not necessary, moreover, that all parties be given to
opportunism in identical degree. Indeed, problems of economic
organization are compounded if the propensity to behave
opportunistically is known to vary among members of the
contracting population, since now gains can be realized by expending
resources to discriminate among types.
Id. at 48.
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greatly compounds the effect of opportunism on transactional
dealings.
The problem of opportunism (that is, knowing how
opportunism is distributed) is likely to be even more significant
when coordinating international exchanges. A party is less
likely to know its counterpart well, i.e., have specific knowledge
about the propensity to opportunism, and is less likely to be
able to forecast its counterpart's behavior (as it lacks
experience with others of the contractor's "national type" from
which it can draw inferences).
Further, international transactions may give rise to more
occasions for opportunistic behavior. Parties which deal at a
distance are less able to monitor performance. Reputational
concerns are attenuated with distant contractors. Thus,
opportunism-minimizing is a likely determinant for
multinational structures in general, and ISAs in particular.
ISAs frequently involve substantial investment in physical
and human assets that are transaction-specific. The
uniqueness of the particular technology and services provided
by each party is likely to give rise to conditions of bilateral
monopoly at some point after the initial structuring of the
relationship. These factors alone suggest only that market
exchanges are subject to failure and that some alternative form
of governance is likely to be superior; they do not yet
demonstrate why the ISA form (or any other hybrid
organization) should be more viable than internalization
(through merger/acquisition) to a unitary firm.
Market failures associated with informational exchanges
(such as technology transfers) frequently arise, resulting from
what Arrow defines as the "fundamental paradox" of
information. The value of any proprietary information "for the
purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then
he has in effect acquired it without cost."' A commonly
understood (and more general) case of market failure results
if information is asymmetrically distributed between the
parties to an exchange.5" For Williamson, it is not
67 KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (1971).
5 According to Arrow, 'the critical impact of information on the optimal
allocation of risk bearing is not merely its presence or absence but its
inequality among economic agents." KENNETH ARROW, The Organization of
Economic Activity, in THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
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information asymmetry alone, but asymmetry coupled with (1)
the high cost of establishing information parity and (2)
opportunism that create market failures."
Because of the occasion for Williamsonian opportunism
associated with informational exchanges, alternative
governance structures are suggested. Arrow's "paradox" is
likely to be present in the exchanges underlying ISAs. An
innovator will possess far greater knowledge about the subject
technology; a potential alliance partner offering distribution
services, for example, will far better know the local market.
These specific information asymmetries may be addressed by
using hybrid organizational forms."0
Organizational hybrids, including ISAs, can be located on
an organizational continuum that extends between exchange
(freely bargained coordination of factors through markets) and
the integrated organization."' Transaction cost theory
suggests that coordination by exchange is generally more
efficient, but when markets fail (where transaction costs are
high) internalization is often the superior institutional
structure. The existence of organizational hybrids featuring
joint ownership and control, such as ISAs, is less easily
explained."
EXPENDITURE: THE PPB SYSTEM, A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 59-73 (1969).
53 WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 51, at 31.
"See infra text accompanying notes 69 to 77 for the discussion of
Hennart's analysis of reciprocal informational market failures as a
determinant of joint ventures.
*' Karl Llewellyn observed in 1931 that the "exchange spectrum" ran the
full gamut from pure market to hierarchy. Karl Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 727 (1931).
According to Williamson:
The focus [of transaction cost study of economic institutions] runs
the gamut from discrete market exchange at the one extreme to
centralized hierarchical organization at the other, with myriad
mixed or intermediate modes filing the range in between. The
changing character of economic organization over time-within and
between markets and hierarchies-is of particular interest.
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 42, at 16.
"i Williamson notes that critics of transaction cost economics have
objected to its emphasis on the polar forms of markets and hierarchies to the
neglect of hybrids. Oliver E. Williamson,. Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN.
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Within hybrid organizations, free exchange is at least in
part abandoned (perhaps due to concerns about opportunism),
but neither does total internalization result. Rather, the two
sponsoring firms remain independent in their larger missions,
but operate a specific pooling of assets through a joint
governance structure and share claim to the resulting residual.
For transaction cost theory the greater challenge is not showing
which markets fail and why they do so, but showing why a
mixed or complex structure (such as an ISA) is transaction cost
minimizing when compared to the unitary firm.
Jean-Francois Hennart applies the transaction cost
framework to model a theory of equity joint ventures."
Although both equity joint ventures and ISAs are
organizational hybrids, they are quite different structures,
whether viewed from formal, financial or governance
perspectives; equity joint ventures are defined by Hennart as
"aris[ing] whenever two or more sponsors bring given assets to
an independent legal entity and are paid for some or all of their
contribution from the profits earned by the entity .... .'
Hennart's theoretical work, however, has significant
implications for a more general transaction cost model for the
existence of hybrid organizations, including strategic alliances.
According to Hennart, there are four reasons for the
existence of a joint venture, each of which may be necessary
but is not alone sufficient. These are (1) accessing economies
of scale and diversifying risk, (2) overcoming entry barriers, (3)
pooling complementary bits of knowledge, and (4) allaying
xenophobic reactions.6 5
Hennart argues that all joint ventures (but his reasoning
would seem to apply to all hybrid organizations) are devices to
bypass inefficient markets for intermediate inputs."" Among
Sc. Q. 269, 269 (1991).
' Jean-Francois Hennart has developed a transaction-cost analysis to
organizational hybrids in a series of articles. See Jean-Francois Hennart,
Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most Transactions are a Mix of
'Market" and 'Hierarchy", 2 ORG. SC. (1992). See also Hennart, Theory of
Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 2; The Transaction Costs Theory of Joint
Ventures: An Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the United States,
37 MGMT. ScI. 483 (1991).
"' Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 2, at 361-62.
"Id. at 363.
"Id. at 364. "The presence of inefficiencies in intermediate markets is
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the categories of market failures explored by Hennart are those
involving the following intermediate markets: (1) capital, (2)
marketing/country-specific knowledge, (3) tacit technology, (4)
distribution, (5) nationality, and (6) intermediate inputs.'
Market failures can justify the existence of equity links, but,
as Hennart explicitly recognizes," a transaction cost theory
of hybrid organizations must explain why firms choose to form
a hybrid (joint governance) as opposed to internalizing (through
a merger/acquisition).
Hennart explains the existence of certain joint ventures to
the simultaneous failure of at least two markets.65 Thus, a
complex governance structure can be expected, for example,
where one firm is to provide technology7 0 and the other a
distribution network,1 as the long-term provision of both of
these inputs are susceptible to Williamsonian opportunism.
Information, according to Hennart, is often sold in
inefficient markets.7' Patented information is not subject to
Arrow's "paradox," as its content is disclosed in the patent
filing. However, important ancillary knowledge (necessary to
exploit a particular technology) may not be disclosed, and this
information may be subject to exchange failure. Further, much
"tacit knowledge" is embodied in employees; it cannot be
transferred without the transfer of specific personnel.
thus a necessary condition for [joint ventures] to emerge ... " Id. This
assertion clearly puts Hennart in the transaction cost theory school.
' Id at 370. In his discussion, Hennart shows how these various
categories are subject to Williamsonian opportunism.
,s See Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 2, at 369.
, A single market failure would suggest simple internalization; one firm
should acquire the other in order to eliminate the market failure associated
with contracting and the accompanying risk of opportunism. The market
failures are reciprocal in that each joint venture participant provides an
intermediate good to the other which is subject to market failure. This
feature is a necessary element for Hennart's explanation of why each of the
joint venture partners resists acquisition. Id. at 369-70.
70 Proprietary technology is particularly vulnerable to market failure.
Id. In the Joint Production Relation example, proprietary technology would
be provided by Firm USA.
7'1 Goodwill, know-how (including tacit technology and country specific
knowledge) and distribution services are cited by Hennart as intermediate
goods subject to reciprocal market failure. I&. at 370. In the Joint
Production Relation example, these factors would be provided by Firm Japan.
" Hennart follows Arrow here. See Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint
Ventures, supra note 2, at 365-67.
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Distribution services are also subject to market failure.78
First, there are often a small number of potential suppliers of
distribution services. Second, there is substantial up-front
investment to be made in developing distribution structures,
giving rise to a specific asset. Finally, distributors have local
knowledge (about their territories), which is difficult to price.
When both technology markets and distribution markets fail,
a hybrid structure can be anticipated.
Joint ventures, according to Hennart, are used to acquire
assets which have two principal characteristics: (1) they are
firm-specific, in the sense that they cannot be easily dissociated
from the firm itself, and (2) they are public goods, in the sense
that they can be shared at low marginal cost. If assets are
public goods, it is more expensive to replicate them than to
acquire them, but if they are also firm-specific, they may be
difficult to acquire without also acquiring the other assets of
the firm. Hennart's theory argues that a hybrid structure may
permit a shared use of these value-enhancing assets while
avoiding an unnecessary or undesired takeover of extraneous
assets bound within a firm. 4
While Hennart does not address ISAs in his work, 5 the
two essential conditions he identifies are likely to be present
in the instances of ISAs. For example, the transfer of
technology across national boundaries, a common element of
ISAs is both subject to market failure 6 and to the shared use
7 See Hennart, Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 2, at 367-68.
74 Id at 371. Hennart cites the example of a distribution system as a
firm-specific public good:
Distribution is often a public good, as it has zero or low marginal
cost: once a channel is organized the additional cost of using it for
similar or complementary products is small, or even negative if the
new products 'fill in' a line. In some cases, distribution assets are
also firm-specific, in the sense that they could not be sold
independently from the rest of the firm's operations: if vertical
integration between manufacturing and distribution is efficient, then
the distribution assets of the firm to be acquired will be linked to
the manufacturing plants, and the two must be bought as a package
.... A [joint venture] in this case offers distinct advantages, since
it allows vertical integration into distribution without the need to
acquire the linked manufacturing assets.
Id. at 371-72.
" Indeed, Hennart focuses on equity joint ventures, explicitly excluding
complex contractual structures from his theory. Id. at 361.
" Arrow's "paradox" argues that technology markets fail because a
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condition. 7
ISAs have certain market-like features in that the two
participating firms continue to conduct discrete exchanges with
each other while maintaining formally independent roles. On
the other hand, certain organization-like features are
introduced as well. Contractual limits are placed on the terms
of exchange,"8 and overall limitations are set to govern
activity with potentially rival firms.7 Within their areas of
respective unilateral authority, the firms utilize their existing
internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. 0
ISAs constitute a formal, continuing and strategically
important relationship between two participating firms that
transcends normal third-party contracting. Within an alliance,
the prospect of the realization of significant business
advantages is linked to the maintenance of a broad area of
cooperation and coordination. ISAs also constitute explicit
strategies for different national markets, including the
suppression, in whole or in part, of competition between the
participating firms in specific markets.8 " As such, ISAs have
purchaser of technology cannot calculate its value without having the
technology revealed, after which it is no longer essential that the purchaser
pay. Patents, which ensure an innovator of an economic return
notwithstanding disclosure, is only a partial solution to Arrow's paradox.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
7 Technology is, to a certain extent, a public good, in that it can be
shared with others without increasing its cost. There is some diminishment
to the provider of an exclusive technology, however, in that the introduction
of competition reduces economic rents.
7' Alliances often contain long-term supply arrangements, which control
intrafirm bargaining. Royalty provisions in license agreements also tend to
lock payment rates.
"' The effect of the non-competition obligations implicit in an
international strategic alliance are considerable.
"S There are potential control problems here as well, even when a
participating firm can operate without interference from its partner. The
agents and employees of a firm may not pursue "alliance business" as
effectively as they perform "firm business," particularly if the incentive
structures attenuate loyalty. Stock options and other equity mechanisms
are likely to distort agent behavior, as there may be a greater return on
devoting energies to "firm business."
" Williamson and others tend to understate imperfect competition
explanations for the existence of complex organizational structures.
Imperfect competition explanations are less easily resisted in the
international setting, where discrete national markets are visibly
maintained.
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attracted the attention of antitrust scholars 2 and policy
makers;" in the United States, a debate continues as to
whether the competitive benefits of ISAs outweigh their alleged
harm to competition."
2.2. Contractual Aspects
For a number of structural reasons, parties to an ISA are
unlikely to rely seriously on the law of contract to assure
reliable performance from their counterparts. The notion that
managers ignore formal contract protection and construct
extra-contractual structures to assure performance has been
observed in other complex contractual settings.8 5 In complex
organizational structures the law of contract frequently
approaches irrelevancy; special factors present in the case of
ISAs make this even more so. As will be argued below, ISAs
consist of a set of "structural agreements," some of which, when
considered singly, may well be vigorous and enforceable
contracts under traditional national law. The argument about
the irrelevancy of contract rather addresses the ISA
relationship in whole.
As ISAs straddle national boundaries, resort to a particular
national legal system is likely to be unreliable in
comprehensively resolving unanticipated controversies. This
is so because there exists more than one domestic legal system
Pitofsky, among others, has argued that the suppression of potential
competition is the principal anticompetitive concern in alliances. See Robert
Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 898 (1985).
"= See Jorde & Teece, supra note 1; see also Symposium: Joint Ventures,
Including Strategic Alliances, to Develop Computer Technology, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 859 (1993).
83 See generally FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES: ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE (1990).
Joseph Kattan, Assistant Director for Policy and Evaluation, Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission argues that current analysis of the
competitive benefits of alliances is adequate. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust
Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards
of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 945-54 (1993).
"" See Anthony L. Clapes, Blinded by the Light: Antitrust Analysis of
Computer Industry Alliances, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (1993).
85 See generally Macaulay, supra note 22 (relations between
manufacturers and their suppliers); Hadfield, infra note 107 (franchising).
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which can assert potential authority over the alliance.86
Multiple jurisdictions create possibilities of substantive conflict
of laws, as the rival legal systems will often provide for
different and strategically competing results.8 7 The prospect
of conflicting law in turn creates substantial additional legal
uncertainty for the ISA beyond that encountered by a purely
domestic contractual structure.
The conflict of laws scenario anticipates two legal systems
vying to operate; an equally plausible and no less troublesome
scenario is indifference on the part of the various national legal
systems to resolving controversies or filling gaps. This may be
simply the result of the attenuation of any particular
nationality to characterize a transnational organization; an
ISA, with its multiple participants of differing nationalities, is
arguably even more "state-less" than is the multinational
enterprise. Alternatively, legal indifference may be driven by
an equitable reluctance of a national court to give effect to
specific legal imputations where one party is foreign to the
source legal system and cannot plausibly be said to have
"elected" to have gaps filled accordingly.
Further, an alliance, while in some sense a unitary
organization, is formed, as will be discussed below, not by a
single organizational instrument, like a corporate charter or a
partnership agreement that is authorized under a single
domestic legal regime. Rather, an ISA consists of a series of
"structural agreements" entered between the parties. These
agreements may, according to their respective terms, appeal to
different legal systems to resolve ensuing controversies, thus
implicating multiple jurisdictions over the ISA relation.88
SB The respective national courts of both contractors can plausibly claim
a role in resolving a dispute. In addition, other national courts, such as
those ofthe particular markets servicedby the alliance, can assert authority,
based on the site of the performance of contract obligations.
87 This is particularly the case where a domestic legal result is
mandatory, in that the affected parties cannot consensually elect to avoid
its operation by stipulation (e.g., worker protection guaranteed by a labor
code).
3' Structuring an ISAthrough multiple agreements, which in turn appeal
to differing national legal systems, is not necessarily the result of sloppy
legal advice. Certain structural agreements, such as licenses of specific
national intellectual property rights, must be governed by the appropriate
national law. Contracts which have a strong locational nexus, such as leases
of realty or employment agreements, are mandatorily governed by the law
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Finally, multiple legal systems give rise to knotty
enforcement problems. Even were a national court to provide
a clear resolution of a dispute, the winning party will often
have considerable difficulties in persuading the courts of
another nation to give the judgment legal effect. This is
particularly true for specific performance remedies, which are
precisely the most desired remedies for guaranteeing
satisfactory cooperation.
3. THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES
3.1. Structural Agreements and Relational Contracts
"Structural agreements" are the central accords running
between the firms participating in a strategic alliance.
Structural agreements formalize the mutual obligations of the
ISA participants with respect to specific economic relations
between them. Together, they provide for a limited transfer of
the use of the core technology" and for the distribution of the
economic benefits flowing from the joint exploitation of that
technology." These ex ante understandings are typically
memorialized by what resemble contracts,"1 but there are
substantial legal and economic differences between these
structural agreements and those relationships entered between
independent, non-repeat dealing parties using analogous legal
forms.2 These agreements are described as "structural" in
that they define an elastic framework upon which the parties
will engage in multiple exchange transactions over a long run.
of the site.
"' Alicense agreement is thus an essential feature of the model of the ISA
discussed in this Article.
" The sharing of gains and profits may be structured through
simultaneous exchanges of various factors between the two parties, and may
be formalized by various agreements governing these transactions, including
the formal license agreement (which may or may not provide for royalty
payments.) Other examples of structural agreements between the ISA
parties include supply contracts, management services contracts, financings
(debt and equity), leases, promotional services and output agreements.
" Strategic alliances are typically formed by a number of structural
agreements. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
""Classical contracting," in Macneil's terms, governs these relationships.
See Macneil, Adjustment of Economic Relations, supra note 19, at 855.
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Typically, one or more key terms in the agreement will remain
unspecified or "open." S
The term "contract" implies the creation of legal obligations
that give rise to certain remedies in a court." While certain
of the structural agreements constituting an ISA are likely to
be viewed by some national legal systems as contracts giving
rise to judicial recourse, they are principally self-executing
consensual structures that can function, albeit less perfectly,
even in the absence of the possibility of traditional contract
remedies." A major design goal determining the structure of
ISAs is enforcement self-reliance, the erection of mechanisms
capable of providing performance assurances independently of
effective access to national contract enforcement. 98
The key structural agreement of an ISA is likely to be a
technology license that underlies the Joint Production Relation.
Here the assumption of enforcement self-reliance must be
somewhat qualified; a license will be generally effective under
a national legal system to convey a partial interest in a piece
of intellectual property. 7  Thus, to return to our example,
Firm USA will largely look to property rights in structuring the
Joint Production Relation with Firm Japan.
That a license is effective as a property conveyance implies
(a) the licensee [Firm Japan] has the right to use the property
within the national [Japanese] territory, (b) the licensee [Firm
Japan] has the right to block other users of the technology, (c)
the licensor [Firm USA] retains a continuing interest in the
residuary, and (d), to a limited extent, the licensor [Firm USA]
has the ability to block continued licensee [Firm Japan] use of
the technology in the event of licensee [Firm Japan] default.
"s "Open" terms may include discrete economic terms, such as prices,
shares and physical quantities, and may include non-identified areas of
responsibility or authority.
9" These traditional contract remedies include restitution, damages
(especially in the Anglo-American tradition) and mandated (specific)
performance.
9r See supra text in Section 2.2.
"See supra note 22.
This follows the distinction between contract rights and property rights.
The conveyance of property rights does not suffer from the same degree of
ambiguity difficulties which afflicts contract. Intellectual property rights
are by their nature national; that is, they are delimited to a specific national
territory. Thus intellectual property rights are not subject either to
competing legal systems (conflict of laws) or to judicial indifference.
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As use of an item of intellectual property is delimited to a
specific national territory, legal recourse to support these
property rights is more likely to be available from a national
court than it might be in resolving many other controversial
aspects of the strategic alliance.
Pure "contract" aspects of a technology license, such as the
right to recover royalties due, are on much shakier enforcement
grounds. These contract features are more likely to demand
international cooperation for effective enforcement (making
enforcement less likely) and more apt to suffer from the risks
of conflicting law and judicial indifference."8 Thus, in the
event of breakdown of the Joint Production Relation between
Firm USA and Firm Japan, Firm USA can anticipate an easier
time blocking continued use by Firm Japan of Firm USA's
technology than will Firm USA have in recovering any accrued
but unpaid royalties from Firm Japan.
The term "relational contract" is also used in the literature
to mark complex contracts and organizational hybrids.9 The
structural agreements underlying strategic alliances clearly
establish an ongoing relationship, and relational norms are
arguably appropriate to their legal interpretation. My use of
the term structural agreements emphasizes that these
agreements not only define various rights and obligations to be
performed throughout an ongoing relationship, but more
importantly define areas of control and authority. In this sense
structural agreements establish a hierarchy in which certain
exchanges are subject to limited fiat. Thus, the hybrid
organization defined by a set of structural agreements goes
beyond the notion of relational contract developed by
Macneil.'"
Further, the notion of relational contract typically describes
a unitary instrument that addresses the totality of the
economic relationship between the contractors, as in the
example of long-term supply or output contracts. Strategic
alliances, on the other hand, typically involve numerous
structural agreements.O'° This distinction between unitary
sSee supra text in Section 2.2.
"See supra note 19 (discussing the "relational contract" school of
Macneil).
,*, See Macneil,Adjustment of Economic Relations, supra note 19, at 889.
's There often will be a "naster agreement" that will explicitly relate the
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relational contracts and the set of structural agreements
constituting the ISA is more than purely formal. The choice
to formally separate the various relations has substantial legal
and organizational effects."°  Potentially offsetting rights
and obligations may be effectively isolated from one another if
embodied in distinct writings. The interplay of all the
structural agreements, taken together, defines the
"relationship" constituting the strategic alliance, the whole of
which is quasi-organizational.
Structural agreements may be understood as default
mechanisms, defining the positions the constituent firms would
assume in the event that continuing negotiations over open
terms ex post break down."° This catastrophic break-down,
after which the parties suspend general cooperation, is
described herein as "alliance failure."' To a certain extent,
structural agreements serve to discourage (but in no sense
eliminate) Williamsonian. opportunism by channeling the
parties' respective unilateral discretion and by locking them
into a relationship.' These structures function to resolve
disputes in an environment where legal recourse is unlikely to
be available.
3.2. Open Terms and the Distribution of Economic Benefits
The structural agreements establishing an ISA are
inherently incomplete. °' The complexity of coordination
various structural contracts entered by the parties. Notwithstanding this
formal feature, the various exchange relations (represented by the various
structural agreements) stand alone in important respects.
102 Importantly, the technology license is memorialized in an independent
instrument. As a technology license is, among other things, a conveyance
of intellectual property under a specific national system, it has a firmer
national grounding than does the overall structure created by the totality
of agreements entered into by the parties to the alliance.
1 3 See infra text in Section 3.2.
1 4 See infra text in Section 4. Macneil makes a similar distinction
between "disruptive" and "non-disruptive" disputes. See Macneil, Adjustment
of Economic Relations, supra note 19, at 876-77. Alliance failure is a
disruptive dispute.
'*5 This Article will emphasize the role playedby those agreements which
license technology and which allocate particular national territories.
1" See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
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required in executing an ISA will necessarily render
contracting-by-specification a practical impossibility. Further,
the parties to an ISA cannot hope to adequately anticipate the
environmental changes which will occur during the term of the
alliance, let alone forecast the moves which will be taken by
rival firms in strategic competition with the alliance.
Therefore, ex ante specification cannot address all
contingencies."
Typically, one or more key terms in the various structural
agreements, such as price, are left open by design.c' The
open term may, however, be bounded by defined limits,
escalator mechanisms or reference to an external benchmark.
Implicitly additional terms, such as the quantum of effort to be
exerted by the distributing firm in marketing a product,'
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.
261 (1985).
" It may be useful, then, to think of these incomplete structural
agreements as "constitutional," outlining the broad objectives of the
cooperation and creating a context for resolving conflicts. See Gillian K.
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 979 (1990).
*" Early contract theory was concerned with terms inadvertently left open
by the parties. In this circumstance an appropriate judicial response would
be to impose terms that the parties (conceivably) could have adopted had
they considered the neglected contingency. Id. at 927. More recent thinking
has recognized that many terms in complex contractual relationships are
deliberately left open by the parties in order to preserve flexibility.
Often, contracts are necessarily and intentionally incomplete
because mutual desires for flexible, but bounded, responses to
uncertain future conditions limit the scope and precision of
verifiable terms. Moreover, incomplete contracts often exist deeply
embedded in an ongoing relationship. The parties are not strangers;
much oftheir interaction takes place 'off the contract," mediated not
by visible terms enforceable by a court, but by a particular balance
of cooperation and coercion, communication and strategy.
Id. at 927-28.
Imputation of open terms by a court is not necessarily appropriate where
the parties intended to work out eventually arising controversies within the
dynamics of an ongoing relationship. (Perhaps a better case for judicial
intervention can be made where the relationship has ceased.) In any event,
as will be argued later in this Article, the possibility of judicial imputation
as a response to incomplete contracting is less likely in the case of
international strategic alliances. The parties may be said, with greater
confidence, to have intended to work things out left to their own devices.
'" Analogous freedoms of movement have been explored in the principal/
agent literature. See, e.g., E. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980);
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are also left open. Specifying one open term (again, such as
price) does not complete the agreement or eliminate the risk
of opportunism if other terms remain open. Terms that remain
open may be used for unilateral compensating or negating
moves, readjusting the distribution of economic benefits.
The overall set of structural agreements operates to
distribute any resulting gains and profits between the firms
participating in the alliance. In unitary, fully-internalized
organizations, residual economic benefits are distributed at the
ownership level, typically in proportion to the capital stake
each owner has in the firm. In vertical markets (the other end
of the organizational continuum), specialized factors are priced
in each discrete transaction through the dynamic process of
bargaining; overall external profitability defines only one set
of bounds for factor prices. Profit shares are mechanically
determined by the bargained-out prices and quantities.
Within strategic alliances, overall profit shares are mapped
by conducting continuous pricing negotiations over several
factor categories. These categories correspond to the various
underlying relational exchanges executed between the firms
and between each firm and the exterior. For example,
technology and trademark royalties, management services, and
interest charges are all formal premises for distributing gains
and profits. No single class of relational exchanges distributes
the alliance's profits; rather, the conjunction of the various
credits and charges divides the economic benefits between the
alliance participants.
Transactions with third parties determine, in some sense,
the overall profits to the alliance. Depending on the structure
of the alliance, one party may have unilateral pricing discretion
with respect to third parties, be they suppliers to or customers
of the alliance. Since many of the terms to the various
exchanges are likely to be left open ex ante, actual profit shares
are effectively bargained for throughout the life-cycle of the
alliance."0
11 In the MTU-Pratt & Whitney alliance, the allocation of risk-bearing
shares for each successive project is purposely left open, to be bargained out
as specific projects are undertaken. See Kandebo, supra note 5, at 29
(indicating that the Pratt & Whitney-MTU agreement required a minimum
ten percent effort commitment by the non-initiating party to enter a specific
project).
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As proprietary technology is the subject of strategic
alliances, there will be monopoly rents to distribute between
the parties. Formally, a strategic alliance represents partial
integration of the constituent firms. This integration may be
either horizontal, vertical, or both; thus, monopoly rents
associated with the core technology may be magnified upon
formation of the alliance.
A strategic alliance must include mechanisms which can
reduce the risk that one party will opportunistically command
all the joint profits from the alliance. In order to do so, factor
prices must be confined, although not inflexibly, within some
range which permits both parties to enjoy an ongoing share of
the joint profits at some level of acceptability.
3.3. Specification, Control of Assets, and Authority
The contractual architecture specifies the elements or
factors each firm will contribute to the alliance, and defines the
ongoing, functional role of each of the participating firms.
These performance obligations include tasks to be executed at
the time the alliance is established and continuing or
operational responsibilities and authority throughout the
alliance's duration."' Ideally, all essential tasks would be
identified and allocated at the time of the formation of the
alliance in order to delineate responsibility between the firms.
This would include specifying ex ante all elements of technology
controlled by the respective firms which should be contributed
to the alliance and the terms of such access."
2
As noted above, however, this degree of specification is
likely to be a physical and cognitive impossibility. The best the
parties can hope to achieve is a broad definition of areas of
responsibility," ' with the understanding that specific tasks
... In its alliance with Toshiba, Motorola engineered a contractual
requirement that Motorola first obtain a certain market share in Japan
(through Toshiba's distribution effort) before Toshiba would be given access
to Motorola's industry-leading microchip technology. See Mark Hornung,
Surging Semiconductors Improve Motorola Picture, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus.,
May 11, 1987, at 71. This both reinforces Toshiba's designated responsibility
and reduces its ability to unilaterally exploit Motorola once possessing the
technology.
112 A formal, one-time contribution of a property interest in a technology
may mask the need for the provision of a series of on-going support functions.
11 Managers recognize functional areas ofresponsibility, such as product
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identified during the life of the alliance should be performed
by that firm within whose area of responsibility the specific
task lies. Of course, these classifications are unlikely to be free
from ambiguity or dispute.
Unassigned tasks, whether unspecified or unanticipated,
present ex post occasions for opportunistic behavior. Either
party may refuse to perform functionally essential tasks, thus
forcing the other party to unilaterally bear the burden of
performance or face the prospect of alliance failure. In some
circumstances, a party may unilaterally seek to perform non-
delegated tasks in order to assert responsibility and authority
for a particular function. This too is a potential occasion for
opportunism.
When functional control of specific assets is placed in the
hands of a particular party, that party can unilaterally assure
the performance of the functions associated with those assets
without fear of delay. In the case of transferred technology,
that party holding the bundle of intellectual property rights
conceivably possesses both control of and authority to exploit
the technology without requiring significant cooperation from
the other party. Dividing control over specific assets, such as
technology or distribution rights, can define the functional
distribution of performance obligations and concentrate the
authority to autonomously execute those tasks through one
party's internalized hierarchy.
The distribution of control over specific assets often serves
to specify the allocation of undefined tasks, thus protecting the
party in control of the assets from vulnerability to
opportunistically withheld cooperation. To return to our
example, Firm Japan, as a licensee of Firm USA, can
autonomously exploit Firm USA's technology (within the limits
of the license's terms) once Firm USA's technology is
transferred, without further need for cooperation from Firm
USA."
A conveyance of all rights to an asset would not protect the
party who yields control of the asset from the risks of non-
development, beta testing, marketing, support, etc. and could intuit specific
tasks falling under these categories.
114 Strictly speaking, this is a considerable exaggeration; technology
transfers are rarely complete, and Firm Japan is likely to be dependent on
Firm USA for valuable support, add-ons and enhancements, andinnovation.
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performance by another party. A division of property rights
(such as the separation of ownership from control and use) can
function to protect the parties not controlling the asset.1 5
Moreover, the retention of residual ownership, such as the
interest held by a licensor of a technology, and its associated
power to recall the asset in case of hold-up, can protect the
owner. Firm USA, notwithstanding the license to Firm Japan,
continues to have a legal interest in the intellectual property
embodying the technology that it could conceivably recall.
3.4. Allocation of National Markets
ISAs are designed to operate in specific national territories.
Typically, certain territories are designated to be exploited by
the alliance while other territories are reserved, either for
exploitation by either or both parties, or for cooperation with
other firms.
The territoriality of strategic alliances follows both from
contractual specification and from the use of national property
rights. Various structural agreements will specify and
coordinate functions necessary for the alliance to tap specific
national markets. A distribution agreement, such as the one
between Firm USA and Firm Japan in the example, may
provide one firm with the exclusive contractual right to service
end-users within a national territory. Such a concession is
often coupled to marketing and customer support obligations,
and is often linked to non-competition provisions which restrict
other firms from servicing the market concerned.1 The
alliance will customarily be obliged to supply the demands of
the distributor-party to the extent necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the particular market."' Similar territorial
marketing rights are found in typical manufacturing licenses,
115 Jean-Francois Hennart noted that his insight into reciprocal market
failure as an underlying condition for equity joint ventures derives from his
reflections on the landowner/sharecropper relationship, a classic division of
title and use of real property rights. Informal conversation with Jean-
Francois Hennart, Professor of International Business, University of Illinois
(Dec. 1992).
.. These features may or may not be countenanced under a specific
competition law (antitrust) regime.
117 This supply obligation may be memorialized in a separate supply
agreement.
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where the output is destined for particular national markets.
The conveyance of specific national intellectual property
rights, such as patents and trademarks, can further enhance
the demarcation of those markets to be serviced by the
alliance."' In order for a firm to effectively import,
manufacture and/or market a product which incorporates
nationally protected intellectual property rights, the firm must
either own those rights or be a licensee. Once a firm holds
those rights, it can proceed to unilaterally exploit the national
markets if the necessary technological know-how has been
transferred. Its output, however, might be blocked from those
markets where it does not hold the appropriate national
rights.119
Thus, to continue with the example, the Distribution
Relation between Firm USA and Firm Japan will be delimited
to the Japanese territory, both contractually and by the use of
national (in this case Japanese) intellectual property rights.
Firm Japan will receive rights in Firm USA's Japanese
trademarks; it will be effectively disabled from marketing Firm
USA's products outside of Japan, as it will not have
authorization to the appropriate trademarks for other
territories.
4. THE PROSPECT OF ALLIANCE FAILURE AND
ITS IMPACT ON ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
Alliances are more vulnerable to failure than are fully
integrated organizations (i.e., firms). A firm withdraws from
a business activity when its risk-adjusted profit expectations
do not constitute an adequate return on capital. An alliance,
on the other hand, will be constrained to cease its activity
whenever any party withdraws. Any participant can be
expected to do so when its profit expectations are insufficient,
11 For an example of the use of national intellectual property rights to
clearly demarcate an exclusive distributorship, see Joined Cases 56 & 58/64,
Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299 (voiding
the trademark license agreements between the manufacturer and its
exclusive distributor as they operated to segment the Community into
national markets contrary to provisions of the EC's Treaty of Rome).
... The use of intellectual property rights to block parallel imports (or,
as they are more commonly and pejoratively known, "gray-market goods?)
is treated variously under different national legal regimes.
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even if the overall activity pursued by the alliance remains
adequately profitable.
Alternatively, a party may leave a profitable alliance if
doing so permits it to pursue a more lucrative opportunity, such
as entering another alliance involving similar technology."' °
Likewise, business failure of either party may doom an
otherwise profitable alliance. Finally, the alliance may end
when one party acquires the other, and integrates the
concerned assets and factors within a unitary organization.121
Note the particular sensitivity of the international alliance:
each party will evaluate the adequacy of its return according
'" MTU and Pratt & Whitney first announced a technical cooperation
alliance for commercial aircraft engines in early 1990. See Nicholas C.
Kernstock & JeffreyM. Lenorovitz,Daimler Benz, United Technologies Agree
to Link MTU, Pratt Engine Units, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2,
1990, at 20. General Electric (U.S.), which had a 25 year relationship with
MTU, including an existing and prospective alliance, was incensed and sued
Daimler-Benz (MTU's parent) for $ 1,150 million. See Roderick Oram &
Charles Leadbeater, GE Sues Daimler-Benz for $1.15bn, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1990, para. 1, at 1. GE announced that it would have to reevaluate its
relationship with MTU in light of the Pratt & Whitney alliance; MTU was
to be no longer considered as a potential risk-sharing partner for GE's new
GE90 large turbine engine. See Kernstock & Lenorovitz, supra, at 20. A
U.S. district court temporarily blocked MTU's entry into an alliance with
Pratt & Whitney. See Judge Delays Pratt & Whitney Venture with MTU,
AVIATION DAILY, May 14,1990, at 298. In the ultimate settlement, MTU was
blocked from any collaboration (including with Pratt & Whitney) for engines
generating 50,000 to 70,000 pounds of thrust and was terminated from the
GE90 program; MTU remained a partner with GE in the long-standing CF6
program. See Daimler's MTU, Pratt & Whitney Formalise Agreement,
Reuters, Mar. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINRPT File.
MTU and Pratt & Whitney entered into a comprehensive alliance nine
months after the settlement of the GE lawsuit. See GE, MTU Settle Bigfan
Breach of Contract Suit, AEROSPACE DAILY, May 24, 1990, at 324.
... Microgenics (USA) and Boehringer Mannheim GmbH (Germany)
entered into a U.S. $6.5 million development and license agreement in 1988
which was extended and expanded by a U.S. $6 million agreement in 1989.
See Microgenics and Boehringer Mannheim Announce Licensing Agreement,
Bus. WIRE, INC., Aug. 9, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE
File (discussing $6.5 million agreement); Microgenics Announces $6 Million
Licensing and Development Agreement with Boehringer Mannheim, Bus.
WIRE INC., Nov. 13, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File
(discussing $6 million extension of agreement). Boehringer subsequently
acquired Microgenics. See Boehringer Mannheim and Microgenics Announce
Intent to Merge, Bus. WIRE INC., Oct. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BWIRE File. The strategic alliance may have served in this
instance to solve Arrow's "paradox" by permitting Microgenics to signal its
value to Boehringer without the exposure of disclosing its technology prior
to securing compensation.
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to its home standards, colored (at least) by the exchange
performance (including volatility) of its currency of account.
Because ISAs require continued cooperation throughout
their life-cycle in order to be successful, each party will be
subject to a continual concern about the other party's
participation. While opportunistic hold-ups are certainly a
large area of concern, these are not the only forms of alliance
failure that need to be anticipated by the parties. A good faith
party may be constrained into seeking renegotiation of the
basic economic terms of the alliance because of dire economic
circumstances.' Re-bargaining may save an alliance," -
as additional profit shares may keep the distressed party from
withdrawing. Yielding to the claim of duress would preserve
value for the performing partner. Re-bargaining is not,
however, without its costs.
The possibility of alliance failure, therefore, is ever-present.
Firms will enter into alliances only if (a) the probability of
alliance failure is quite low and/or (b) its particular positional
outcome in the event of alliance failure is tolerable."M There
is marked tension between these two conditions. An adequate
"tolerability" of a projected positional outcome in the event of
rupture lessens the incentive for a participating firm to
maintain the alliance, and is thus destabilizing. The conflicting
conditions can be reconciled by recalling that the decision to
enter an alliance involves a comparison of alternative
organizational forms.'25
The alliance entry decision is more complex than the usual
firm versus market decision, because a party contemplating an
alliance must evaluate non-entry against a probabilistically
, Klein et al. dispute Williamson's assertion that opportunism is
meaningfully distinguished from simple self-seeking behavior by the presence
of guile. Guile or not, a held-up party is likely to feel oppressed. Benjamin
Klein ET AL., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 297, 302 (1978).
118 The AT&T/Olivetti alliance was renegotiated several times prior to its
dissolution. See Bannon infra note 140.
124 NEC clearly benefitted from the technology transferred to it by
Honeywell during the period of their alliance. See supra note 2.
" This, of course, is Williamson's famous insistence that ' clomparative
economic organization never examines organization forms separately but
always in relation to alternatives." See Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, supra note
62, at 269.
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weighted alternative constructed from both cooperative and
non-cooperative, post-alliance outcomes. It may be that both
(a) cooperation within the alliance and (b) autonomous
operation after alliance failure are superior alternatives to non-
entry, thus promoting the initial entry into the alliance. Yet,
at least for a period, the alliance alternative is significantly
superior to alliance failure, thus promoting stability once the
alliance is established.
Structural mechanisms can depress the possibility of
alliance failure by providing incentives for the parties to
remain committed to the alliance.12 Perhaps alliance failure,
like death, is ultimately unavoidable; 2 ' still the parties may
well profit by delaying its occurrence and extending the
productive life of the alliance, permitting each firm to achieve
its particular financial and strategic objectives.
The various structural agreements will operate to allocate
assets and factors should the strategic alliance fail. Provisions
of the agreements may explicitly distribute the assets in the
case of either general alliance failure or upon (contractually
isolated) breaches of particular agreements. In either case
there is an additional element of performance expected of the
parties. At the time of the rupture they will be expected to
yield up or reconvey those specific assets lying in their
respective control in accord with the prior agreement.
A more likely case, however, is that alliance failure will
mark the cessation of all cooperative behavior, including
respect for the ex ante sorting out of assets, as the parties will
instead seek to maximize their respective strategic positions
and will resort (to the extent possible) to self-help. Most
importantly, the parties may enter into active competition with
one another in the factor and product markets upon alliance
failure,"' for which certain assets previously devoted to the
' These incentives may be positive, in the sense of an enhanced return
to be received from continued cooperation, or negative, in the sense of a
penalty or cost to be borne. The "technology bonds", see infra text in Section
5.1., incorporate both enhanced return for cooperation and costs in the event
of rupture.
127 Full integration is the more common approach for permanent
arrangements. Corporations nominally have perpetual life.
18 AT&T established an alliance with Italtel (Italy) which then entered
into competition with AT&Ts prior alliance partner, Olivetti, in Italy,
Olivetti's "home" market. See Bannon infra note 140.
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alliance, including most certainly the technology,129 are of
considerable value. s3
In most cases, then, the structural agreements will specify
a series of strategic positions occupied by the two firms vis-a-
vis each other during all times within the life-cycle of the
alliance as to the control of specific assets; it is from these
positions that the firms will commence non-cooperative
behavior in the event of alliance failure.
5. PLANNING FOR ALLIANCE FAILURE
5.1. Posting of Technology Bonds
Of critical importance in the international strategic alliance
is the distribution of control over the core technology, especially
in the event of alliance failure. The license agreement can be
usefully thought of as providing a reciprocal "technology bond,"
which both the licensor and the licensee in some sense forfeit
if alliance failure occurs.' Technology licensing, as a form
of partial conveyance of intellectual property, leaves control in
a rather precarious position in the event of alliance failure.
This ambiguous situation creates incentives for the two parties
to resume cooperation.
3 2
12 General Electric's main expressed concern about MTU's entry into an
alliance with Pratt & Whitney was the passage of proprietary technology;
GE alleged that information possessed by MTU would allow a competitor to
build an engine matching GE's product. See Roderick Oram & Charles
Leadbeater, GE Sues Daimler Benz for $1.15bn, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1990,
at 1. GE likely feared the emergence of a viable trans-Atlantic rival. By
entering into an alliance with German MTU, U.S. Pratt & Whitney was
thought to have greater access to developing European markets.
1" Some assets, such as distribution systems, are by their nature subject
to exclusive use in the sense that they may be unilaterally withheld from the
emerging competitor. Other assets, such as transferred technology, are
capable of joint use, in that neither competitor can autonomously block the
use of the technology except by resort to a legal system.
1" The "technology bond" is thus an analogue of the "nonsalvageable
asset" described by Klein and Leffler. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 22,
at 627-29.
1" The less favorable (i.e. non-cooperative) outcome is a scorched-earth
policy, where the technology is effectively destroyed as to a particular
national territory. There are, of course, competitive scenarios where
destruction of the technology is in the clear interest of one of the parties.
This is to state the lesson that opportunism can never be entirely
eliminated; its management has its costs too.
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Recall that the definition of strategic alliance used in this
article specifies that the legal ownership of the core technology
remains in the hands of the licensor firm. Although the
retention of ownership is relatively unambiguous from a legal
perspective, it does not necessarily or even likely result in the
return of full control of the core technology to the licensor in
the event of alliance failure. The issue of control of the core
technology upon alliance failure is in no way the same as the
issue of operational control... within the alliance since the
latter is of concern only for cooperative outcomes.
The licensor may not control all the knowledge necessary
to exploit the core technology in the foreign jurisdiction. "Tacit
knowledge" (which typically includes operational knowledge
within the foreign territory) is embodied in the individuals
possessing it; to the extent that these individuals are agents
(employees) of the licensee, it is impossible for the licensor to
capture and utilize this often essential knowledge. To use our
example, even were Firm USA able to recover all its conveyed
rights from Firm Japan, it may not have sufficient knowledge
to occupy Firm Japan's role, particularly within the Japanese
market. Firm Japan's tacit knowledge may be inaccessible and
largely incapable of reproduction.
Even if the core technology is protected by intellectual
property rights, retraction by the owner may be difficult. The
licensor might be able to terminate continued unilateral
exploitation of the core technology by the licensee by prevailing
in a national judicial contest based on its ownership of the
intellectual property. But it is also true that the licensee may
be able to block alternative use of the core technology on the
part of the licensor, at least in the subject foreign territory,
based on the allegedly continuing force of the repudiated
license agreement. Firm Japan may be able to block Firm
USAs reassertion of control of the Japanese intellectual
property rights that were the subject of the now, arguably
voided, license, thus clouding Firm USA's title. In the end, the
licensor may prevail in recovering its rights in the technology,
but not without experiencing a discouraging level of cost and,
" Anderson and Gatignon define operational control as "the ability to
influence systems, methods and decisions." Erin Anderson & Hubert
Gatignon, Modes of Foreign Entry: A Transaction Cost Analysis and
Propositions, J. IN VL Bus. STUD. 1, 3 (Fall 1986).
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more importantly, harmful delay.
Moreover, the licensor will be vulnerable to competition
from the licensee.'" Even if the licensee cannot perfectly
substitute the withdrawn core technology, the intimate
knowledge it already holds of the core technology (this
knowledge is, of course, irreversibly transferred), as well as
ancillary knowledge it possesses about the licensor and its
strategies, gives the licensee a sizeable advantage in
subsequent competition. Firm Japan, even if ultimately cut off
from the use of Firm USA's technologies, will continue to
possess significant competitive insights into Firm USA's
strategies.
For these and other reasons, technology transfers within
strategic alliances are often effectively irreversible. The
dynamic nature of technological development further
exaggerates this tendency; a licensing firm committing to a
technology alliance may be exhausting all alternative
opportunities to exploit the core technology, as its technological
leadership in a specific target market may evaporate in the
time elapsing to alliance failure. The licensor, once committed
to an alliance, may be bound to a bargain, even if subsequent
conditions render it a bad bargain." 5 Alliance failure, in
such circumstances, will mean that any prospect for exploiting
the technology in the foreign territory will be lost.'
The technology possessed by the alliance likely represents
a valuable combination of technological elements provided by
both firms. These synergistic economies are subject to loss in
13 This is precisely the concern articulated by GE in its lawsuit seeking
to block MTU's joining an alliance with its rival Pratt & Whitney. See Judge
Blocks Pratt Venture with German Firm, J. COM., May 11, 1990, at 5B; GE
Agrees to Settle Its Daimler-Benz Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,1990, at D4; GE,
Daimler-Benz to Renegotiate, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1990, at 3; Sandra
Sugawara, Aerospace Firms ie Fortunes to Foreigners: Boeing, GE, UTC's
Pratt Pick Partners for Global Competition, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1990, at
HI; Shahram Victory, GE v. Daimler-Benz, Am. LAW., June 1990, at 26.
.S This extra-contractual consideration may be far more binding than any
legal obligation arising from contract.
1'" Many countries require that intellectual property be "worked"in order
for protection to be extended. Such a requirement would put the licensor
firm in a worse dilemma: its choices would be to (a) continue to support the
alliance even though it may lose money doing so, (b) purchase cooperation
(a release) from the licensee firm at a cost reflecting the opportunistic
position or (c) see the core technology used at no cost by a rival firm, who
would then occupy the market.
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the event of alliance failure. The "technology bond" creates a
mutual hostage situation, which underlies many instances of
organizational stability. The sharing of technology can thus
decrease the likelihood of one party exacting concessions from
the other by threatening withdrawal from the alliance. This,
in turn, increases participant confidence that the alliance will
continue at least long enough to permit it to reach its relevant
goals. The cooperation that proceeds from the mutual hostage
situation does not necessarily prolong the life of the alliance;
an acquisition of one alliance partner by the other is not an
infrequent cooperative outcome which then eliminates the
mutual hostage tension.
Further, to follow a non-cooperative scenario, the sharing
of technology leaves both firms potentially better off in the
event of alliance failure, or at least not appreciably worse off,
than they would have been had they never entered the alliance.
While these non-cooperative outcomes are generally less
attractive than is the realization of a successful alliance, they
may still constitute an improvement over the status quo ante.
Again, putting legal complications aside,""7 the shared
technology is largely available for independent use by each of
the former participants. It may well be that the utility of the
technology acquired outweighs the loss of exclusivity of the
technology exchanged, for it is only the exclusivity of use and
not the use itself which is lost.
5.2. Competition in National Markets
ISAs involve the designation of specific national territories
forjoint exploitation. Implicitly, all other markets are reserved
by the participants. 3 ' These excluded markets may be
currently serviced by either participant, by one participant and
another firm in an alliance, by both firms in active competition,
or by neither firm.
13See infra text in Section 3.3.
18 Conceivably, non-competition terms could be incorporated into the
various structural agreements in order to divide the reserved markets
between the participants. In many jurisdictions, however, such provisions
would run afoul of national competition law. Even were they not to subject
the former participants to penalties, the restrictions are likely to be deemed
unenforceable by a national court asked to enforce them upon alliance
failure.
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The firms may allocate tasks differentially within the
various markets developed by the alliance. Typically, each firm
would undertake distribution in those markets where it has a
strong distributional infrastructure and a high degree of end-
market goodwill, such as its respective home national market.
Thus each participant may be a supplier as to some national
markets and a distributor as to others; the Distribution
Relation is frequently reciprocated."'
Whatever the roles played by the respective participants,
the serving of markets by the alliance is likely to produce
greater economic benefit than would the alternative of both
firms serving the market in vigorous competition. While an
alliance may be viewed as procompetitive in certain
circumstances, by introducing a new firm or new products to
a market, in another sense it is inevitably anticompetitive in
that the two parties to the alliance, whether actual market
participants or potential entrants, agree themselves not to
compete in that market. While one or both firms may not have
been present in the particular market before the establishment
of the alliance, they are both more likely to remain in the
market after alliance failure in order to capitalize on the
investments made and on the acquired local knowledge and
goodwill. 140
A party controlling the necessary elements of technology can
functionally service specific national markets upon alliance
failure; legal impediments to serving these markets, however,
may remain. The firm possessing the distribution channels
utilized by the alliance and well-developed local goodwill has
a substantial advantage in post-alliance competition. To the
extent both firms enter a specific national market previously
served by the alliance, the heightened competition is likely to
S During the AT&T/Olivetti alliance, AT&T distributed Olivetti
computers in the United States and Olivetti distributed AT&T
telecommunications equipmentin Europe. See Brown, supra note 3; Buxton,
supra note 3.
1 " After the rupture of the AT&T/Olivetti alliance, AT&T remained
present in the Italian market, where it undertook an alliance with Italtel.
Lisa Bannon, AT&T, Olivetti Headed for Divorce?, ELECTRONIC NEws, July
17, 1989, at 15.
Likewise, NEC remained in the U.S. computer market after Honeywell
pulled out of the computer development field, ending the NEC/Honeywell
alliance. NEC to Take Full Control of Joint Venture with Honeywell, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSwIRE, Sept. 29, 1989.
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reduce the enjoyment of rents associated with the technology.
The prospect of this loss of rents provides a structural incentive
to maintain cooperation, contributing to the stability of the
alliance. 4" It will be costly for Firm USA to replicate the
distribution channels controlled by Firm Japan. Further, the
ensuing competition between Firm USA and Firm Japan in the
Japanese market will eliminate rents that the two firms could
otherwise have enjoyed jointly.
6. CONCLUSION
A major concern afflicting business organizations operating
across national boundaries is the availability of judicial
enforcement to back up contractual commitments. The
international enforcement problem is particularly acute for a
complex organizational arrangement, such as an ISA, which
relies on consensual agreements for internal ordering.
Notwithstanding these problems, ISAs do exist, which
suggests that the participants have discovered (or devised)
alternative, extra-contractual mechanisms to mutually assure
the prospect of sufficient performance and continued
cooperation.
In this Article, I have suggested that partial conveyances
of intellectual property rights (technology licenses) operate to
assure the cooperation of both parties, describing these
mechanisms as "technology bonds."" The licensee controls
the use of the technology for specific national territories.
Within this grant, the licensee can autonomously service these
markets; it need not buy further cooperation from the licensor.
The licensor retains residual rights which permit it, in the
case of a collapse of cooperation (alliance failure) to block the
licensee's continued use of the technology. The licensor may
not, however, be able to effectively recover the licensed rights
in order to exploit them itself. Because of legal and factual
uncertainty, the licensee may also be able to block the licensor's
use of the technology. This mutual hostage situation
encourages further cooperation,"" although that cooperation
may involve a buyout by one party or the other in order to
141 Thus, distribution rights can also be thought of as a "bond."
141 See supra text in Section 5.1.
4 See supra text in Section 5.1.
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liberate the technology.'"
Further, ISAs typically end up expressly dividing national
markets, designating certain countries to be developed by the
alliance and others to be reserved for unilateral and
competitive service. Within those national markets served by
the alliance, the participants may have different roles. Each
participant may be given the primary distribution function for
certain primary markets.'
The cooperation structured by the entry of an ISA for a
specific national market institutionalizes a suppression of
competition; it is understood (and is often explicitly provided)
that the participants will not themselves compete with the
alliance in these territories. Alliance failure spells, therefore,
not only a resumption of competition between the two firms,
but perhaps the introduction of competition to a national
market where none had existed before. Clearly the two parties
collectively lose something under this scenario by parting ways;
the value of the market under suppressed competition is a
shared good that can only be realized through continued
cooperation.
The participant operating as a distributor has a significant
degree of control of the relevant national territory, as the
supplier participant has likely underinvested in the territory
during the alliance. Entry into this national market (even if
the legal uncertainties surrounding ownership of the technology
are clarified) after alliance failure is likely to be costly to a
supplier firm, particularly if the supplier firm is foreign. This
can act to further cement the relationship.
While I do not discount the possibility that participants in
an ISA look to some extent to the potential of judicial
enforcement provided by a national legal system to engender
confidence as to their participation, I do believe that judicial
enforcement plays a far lesser role in ISAs than it might in a
complex domestic contractual organization. ISAs demonstrate
that parties can adequately structure complex relationships
without resorting to prepackaged corporate forms where
14 NEC bought out Honeywell's interest in their alliance in order to
consolidate control over former Honeywell technology. See supra note 140.
1 As discussed in Section 3.4., the use of pieces of national intellectual
property can further the demarcation of specific markets to be serviced by
each of the participants. See supra text in Section 3.4.
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important structural elements bind them to continued
cooperation. As long as national legal systems provide certain
property rights, ISAs can continue to function even in the
presence of severe contractual uncertainty.
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